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The awkardness of my title arises from the incompatibility of what 
I have found to be some essential semantic facts and what have {quite 
properly) been understood as basic syntactic categories. Although, 
as I hope to show, the constructions to which I refer have important 
and unique semantic features, no syntactic rules which I have seen gen-
erate these constructions under a single phrase-marker or give these 
constructions a specific category name. And since these· semantic con-
stituents belong to the constructions as a whole and not to any single 
item within them, it is difficult to adapt the semantic facts I wish 
to point out to any semantic theory which assumes that all semantic 
features are contained in the lexical entries of some vocabulary item 
and are introduced at various branching levels of phrase-markers by 
the choice of these items (as in Katz and Fodor, 1964). It is perhaps 
possible to see these semantic constituents as, in a larger sense, pri-
mary syntactic categories which, in a generative semantics, would be 
phrase-markers themselves, with the specific lexical items introduced 
at some branching near the surface structure (as in Fillmore, 1968; 
Postal, 1970). But it is not clear to me that any semantic theory yet 
proposed gives an adequate representation of the data I hope to pre-
sent today. 
This data I have set down on the two accompanying tables, Table 
I gives a phrase structure description of all constructions which take 
THAT-clauses. These descriptions as presented here would seem to sug-
gest that the lexical entry of the term on each line to which a sub-
script has been added would contain a co-occurrence rule requiring a 
THAT-clause whenever the other elements of the phrase-structure descrip-
tion are also specified. Such a presentation suggests that the rules 
which generate these constructions would be headed by one of the gen-
eral form (as suggested in Chomsky 1965) 
(1) S +CS+ (THAT) + S' 
where the Complex Symbol would be a lexical entry specifying the co-
occurrence features, and where the S' would be generated either by 
the recursive application of rule (1) or by the alternative rules in 
the language for the generation of sentences. Any suggestion that these 
constructions should be generated by rules of the general form 
(2.a) S + NP + VP 
(2.b) VP+ Aux + V + (THAT) + S' 
would assume that the various constructions taking THAT-clauses are not 
of a kind and would require considerable elaboration in the generation 
of such sentences as 
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(3.a) Would that it were permissible that you suggest that 
he show that he knows that I am here. 
The recursive application of rule(l), along with the application of 
those simple rules which delete the optional THAT and transform S' 
to an infinitive or participial phrase would produce the more under-
standable sentence 
(3.b) Would that it were permissible for you to suggest that 
he show he knows I am here 
with the phrase structure description (using subscripts from Table I) 








The usefulness of this representation is that it indicates the primary 
importance to the meaning of the whole sentence which belongs to the 
S' which ends it. The various constructions which take THAT-clauses 
have meaning insofar as they are operators upon some other clause with-
out which they have no meaning. 
This representation has other uses as well. It makes easier the 
phrasing of the rules which would disallow such sentences as, 
(4.a) I demand that you know that S' 
(4.b) I hope I am certain that S'. 
Such rules would specify that one CS cannot be the S' of another, or 
that the subject of S' cannot repeat the subject of the preceding CS. 
But its greatest usefulness lies in suggesting that the meaning of all 
such constructions has a basic similarity. This basic similarity I 
have tried to indicate in the paraphrases of Table II, where I have used 
three basic modalities, two relations, and two levels, to indicate the 
meaning of all sentences represented in Table I. I find that these 
constituents are not only sufficient to the paraphrase of all the possi-
ble sentences produced by rule (1), but also necessary to the phrasing 
of the rules suggested above and suggested also by the distinctions 
represented on Table I by, for instance, the indicative and subjunctive 
moods require~ of S'. But, more importantly, I find that these consti-
tuents make it possible also to account for such a basic grammatical 
fact as the idea of first, second and third person, and for the various 
purposes of the fundamental transformations of indicative sentences 
into questions and commands. This being the case, these semantic con-
stituents are obviously fundamental to any semantic analysis of language. 
I would like to offer in the elaboration of these constituents some 
evidence that such an assertion is justified. 
The basic modality of logic is that which makes any assertion 
possible {p), impossible (-p) or necessary {-p-), either because of its 
relation to some other assertion, or by virtue of the theorem of iden-
tity which claims that the assertion (a) entails the impossibility 
of (-a), {-p{-a)), or in other words the necessity of (a), (-p-{a)). 
NO. SUBJECT AUX VERB ADV ADJ PREP OBJ THAT S1MOOD EXAMPLES 
°' 1. NP human v1 IND know, fear, deny 
(X) 
2. N~human v2 SUBJ . wi 11, desire 
3. NP human V3 (NPhuman) IND persuade, tell, show 
4. NP human V4 (TO NP human) IND demonstrate, say, relate 
5. NP human V5 (TO NP human) SUBJ demand, suggest 
6. NP human BE ADJ 6 IND sure, pleased, ashamed 
7. IT BE POSS NP7 IND plan, idea, hope 
8. IT BE POSS NP8 SUBJ wi 11 , demand, request 
9. IT Mg BE IND could,: m_ay, must 
10. M10 SUBJ would 
11. IT BE ADJll (TO NP human) IND possible, certain, mystifying 
12. IT BE ADJ12 (TO NPhuman) SUBJ ~esirable, good, permissible 
~ 13. IT V13 (ADJ TO NP human) IND appear, occur, happen ~ 
~ 
14. IT V14 NP human IND strike, intrigue, please ~ 
~ 15. THERE BE NP15 IND chance, hope, possibility :h ti) 
16. so16 IND so, such 8 ~ 
~ 
TABLE I. Phrase structure constituents of constructions taking THAT-clauses ~ 
~ 
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1. I fear that S' = S' possible; S' uncertain, undesirable to me 
2. I desire that S' = S' desirable to me 
3. I persuaded him that s• = (necessity of S' uncertain, then cer-
tain, to him) desirable to me 
4. I said to him that S' = (S' uncertain, then certain, to him) 
possible 
5. I demanded that s• = (S' desirable to me) certain to recipient of 
demand 
6. I am pleased that s• = (S' necessary, desirable to me) certain to 
recipient 
7. It was his hope thats• = (S' desirable, uncertain to him) certain 
to speaker 
8. It was his will that S' = (S' desirable to him) certain to speaker 
9. It must be that S' = (necessity of S') certain to speaker 
10. Would that s• = S' desirable, uncertain to speaker 
11. It is mystifying to me that S' = s• necessary; S' certain, impos-
sible to speaker 
12. It i~ permissible that S' = (possibility of S' desirable to 
someone) certain to speaker 
13. It occurs to me that S' = (possibility of S') uncertain, then 
certain, to me 
14. It intrigues me that S' =((necessity of S') uncertain, certain, 
to me) desirable to me 
15. There is a chance that S' = s• possible, uncertain 
16. They kidded him so that S' = S' necessary 
TABLE II. Modal paraphrases of examples from TABLE I 
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These modalities are directly represented in nos. (11) and (15) for 
instance in Table I, and are part of the paraphrase of other construc-
tions as well. It is clear, though, that assertions have an additional 
mod a 1 i ty which comes from their being known by, which is to s.~Y, their 
being the potential utterance of, some person. This modality of judg-
ment differs from the modality of logic in being assumed as part of the 
meaning entailed by the syntactic (or semantic) category of NPhuman, 
which means that it can exist apart from the modalities expressing rela-
tions between different sentences, or assertions. It is clear, most 
importantly, that there is as well a modality of desire which, in its 
pure form, will not allow an assertion to exist apart from the asser-
tion of modality itself. Our grammar expresses this connection in 
specifying the subjunctive mood in such a sentence as 
(5.a) I desire that he go 
which differs from 
(5.b) I am certain that he goes 
in making no form of "he go" possible except that followJng from the 
11 desire 11 itself. It is the fact that the pure modality of desire cannot 
affect the modality of logic, and the fact that the pure modality of 
desire cannot operate causally upon the modality of judgment, which 
determine some of the rules which forbid (4.a) and (4.b) above. 
The last two of these modalities belong specifically to the poten-
tial constituents of NPhuman' and it is also this category which may 
be represented by the first and second as well as the third person. 
Judgment and desire are therefore "person-related," which is to say that 
S' in sentences with these modalities will always belong to the modal 
system of either the first, second or third persons in the discourse. 
The same rules which associate modals and persons and thus eliminate the 
sentence. 
(6.a) Will I answer the phone? 
also eliminate 
(6.b) I demand that I know S' 
on the grounds that it is impossible for one person to assert another's 
modality of desire, or necessary for him to assert his own. By the 
same token, modalities are "time related, 11 in such a way as to make the 
meaning of 
(7 .a) I am surprised that S', 
contain the sequence in time 11 S1 improbable -- S' certain;" or make 
the meaning of 
(7.b) I regret that S' 
contain the sequence in time "S' certain -- S' undesirable." This 
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time-relatedness, like person-relatedness, makes impossible various sen-
tences such as 
(7.c) I regret that I do not know that S' 
or 
(7.d) . I am surprised that I am sure that S' 
or at least requires their interpretation in rather complicated ways. 
The same observation, it may be noted in passing, can be made in these 
cases about the tense of S'. 
Sentences such as the above, or some of the sentences listed in 
Table II, make clear the extent to which the recursive embedding of 
modalities creates multilevel sentences, in which the first complex 
symbol determines the modality of the second and of the whole sentence 
consisting of the successive embeddings. This "modal level" is comple-
mentary to the "utterance level" produced by the fact that the modality 
of judgment implies a potential utterance, and by the fact that the 
modality of desire implies specific forms of utterance which in them-
selves produce new modalities in the potential utterances of the hearers. 
The sentence 
(8.a) I suggested that he smoke 
includes in its meaning the paraphrase 
(8.b) I said, 11 Why don't you smoke" 
(or some other form of S' to the same effect), and also the paraphrase 
(8.c) ((S' desirable to me) certain to him) 
with these two modalities existing in a' 11 time-related 11 sequence sepa-
rated by the utterance. 
An utterance, in other words, is itself modal in all these ways 
even when the specific S' is not embedded in modal complex symbols. 
Any utterances come from an "I" and are directed to a 11 you. 11 It contains 
the implicit claim that the utterance S' is certain to the I, and that 
the certainty to you of this certainty to me of S' which results from 
the making of the utterance is desired by the I in all its consequences. 
The making of an utterance a 1 so imp 1 i es that its moda 1 i ty wi 11 change 
for you; to tell you what you already know is superfluous unless after 
being told you will know what you had not known before. Not every 
S~, of course, will be uttered in the form of a simple indicative state-
ment, belonging to the modality of judgment of the speaker. An S' 
may also be recognized as a suggestion, fear, plan, thought, mystery, 
or as any one of the many pure or combined modalities listed among or 
implied by the examples on Table I, without being embedded in the com-
plex symbols which insure this recognition •. They may also be recog-
nized as the consequences of simple transformations, those which turn 
statements into orders, or into those questions which reverse the per-
72 FIFTH KANSAS CONFERENCE 
son-relatedness of the modalities of judgment, and the time-relatedness 
of the modality of desire. We know that the question 
(9.a) Where are you going? 
implies not only the certainty to you and uncertainty to me of S', 
but also the undesirability to me of my uncertainty, and your certainty 
of this undesirability to me, as well as of the necessity of answering, 
which is why you answer 
(9.b) Where am I going? 
which makes no sense except as an acknowledgment of modal complexity. 
It is easy to see that such questions as 
(9.c) You are going? 
and 
(9.d) Why don't you go? 
are not questions at all, but are quite amenable to the obvious modal 
analysis which turns them into an expression of surprise or regret, or 
into a suggestion. 
What this paper has tried to do is to present some data which would 
have to be accounted for in an adequate semantic theory, and to suggest 
some of the specific elements of such a theory. A semantic theory must 
presuppose the existence of modal operators on every utterance, and would 
explain the meaning of any discourse as the relation among its medals. 
Logical theory has always done this, in taking every proposition of an 
argument as an element of the modal relations making up the argument. 
A semantic theory would have to specify the relations among medals which 
would incorporate propositions with the modality of judgment and the 
modality of desire into some set of allowable, or in other words inter-
pretable, relations. Such a theory, it should be noted, would be as 
well a rhetorical theory. The constructions which take THAT-clauses 
are precisely those which have traditionally been taken as the province 
of rhetoric. They contain the terms of human passion and motive, of 
human interaction and dialogue; and they operate to make all the sen-
tences of the language fit into the purposes of human discourse. 
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